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Jean Chrétien’s decade-long tenure as Canadian prime minister was marked with 
numerous overtures for Canada to pursue a path as a “middle power” in world affairs through 
leadership in multilateral institutions. Specifically, this paper investigates Chrétien’s position 
within the Commonwealth of Nations as part of this overarching strategy. This analysis finds that 
Chrétien’s government had a number of noteworthy successes in advancing Nigerian democracy, 
and garnering support for other international issues in the United Nations — such as the Anti-
Personal Mine Ban Convention. However, Chrétien had a number of failures including an inability 
and unwillingness to press for meaningful reforms in Zimbabwe, stopping the genocide in Rwanda, 
and stopping civil wars throughout the Commonwealth.   
Le mandat de Jean Chrétien comme premier ministre du Canada a été marqué par de 
nombreuses opportunités pour le Canada de poursuivre une politique internationale de « puissance 
moyenne », grâce à son leadership dans plusieurs institutions multilatérales. Cet article examine 
plus précisément la position de Chrétien au sein du Commonwealth, dans le cadre de cette stratégie 
internationale pour le Canada. Cette analyse montre que le gouvernement Chrétien a obtenu un 
certain nombre de succès notables en faisant avancer la démocratie au Nigéria, et dans son soutien à 
d'autres questions internationales au sein des Nations Unies, telle que la Convention d'interdiction 
des mines anti-personnel. Cependant, Chrétien a également enregistré un certain nombre d’échecs, 
notamment par son incapacité, ou ses réticences, à faire pression pour obtenir des réformes 
démocratiques au Zimbabwe, à empêcher le génocide au Rwanda ou les guerres civiles dans 
certains pays du Commonwealth. 
 
 
Jean Chrétien’s time as prime minister from 1993 to 2003 is one that can 
now be viewed with a little historical distance and less political dogmatism. 
Politically, Chrétien was (and remains) a major proponent of multilateralism. 
He worked hard, along with his colleagues around the world, to build a better 
world as he saw fit. But, on occasion, this did not happen and the world did not 
progress forward. This paper investigates this dynamic between Chrétien’s 
legacy and his use of multilateralism, especially through one important 
institution, the Commonwealth of Nations.  
Jean Chrétien led the Liberal Party to three straight majorities in the 
House of Commons, in 1993, 1997, and 2000. After he left office in 2003, his 
successor, rival, and former finance minister, Paul Martin, then won a minority 
in Parliament in 2004 preserving, at least for a short period of time, the Liberal 
Party government. Chrétien governed at a time when the New Democratic 
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Party (NDP) was weak, the conservative wing of Canada was divided between 
Reform/Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives, and the Liberal 
Party core was typically strong and disciplined despite some high profile 
quarrels. Chrétien did compete against a very powerful Bloc Quebecois (BQ) 
which, somewhat strangely, became the official opposition after the 1993 
election. He faced challenges throughout the country, from inside and outside 
of his party, but managed to strongly lead Canada for a decade. In fact, 
Chrétien, among other prime ministers, was so powerful that Globe and Mail 
journalist, Jeffrey Simpson, described Chrétien playing a part in leading a 
“friendly dictatorship” (SIMPSON 2002). 
During his time as prime minister, Jean Chrétien attended five 
Commonwealth meetings in his ten-year period as Canada’s head of 
government. Commonwealth meetings are held on a biannual basis; although, 
the meetings are not held at the exact same time on each occasion. Chrétien’s 
election came just after the 1993 Commonwealth meeting in Cyprus, but he 
attended the conferences in New Zealand in 1995, the United Kingdom in 
1997, South Africa in 1999, Australia in 2002, and Nigeria in 2003 (the latter 
was held at the very end of his tenure as prime minister). On each occasion, 
Chrétien had the ability to discuss — and build rapport — with world leaders. 
In essence, the Commonwealth provides another multilateral forum from which 
to discuss major global issues, and to further diplomacy between countries. 
Even though the Commonwealth has limited formal powers, regular meetings 
amongst world leaders at international forums like the Commonwealth help to 
build personal rapport amongst leaders, which, under the right circumstances, 
can lead to further multilateral cooperation at other, more powerful forums like 
the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
Under Chrétien, the Commonwealth received some attention, but not 
much. In his autobiography, Chrétien only mentioned the Commonwealth a few 
times. One such example, in a meeting in New Zealand, took on the very 
serious discussion of Nigerian human rights violations in the mid-1990s 
(CHRETIEN 2010: 365). He also noted the collective decision to expel 
Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in his last meeting in Abuja in 2003 where 
Chrétien stood in opposition to the UK and Australia on the method of how to, 
in a gentler way, expel Zimbabwe from the organization with the door left open 
for re-entry if the necessary reforms were undertaken by the Mugabe 
government (CHRETIEN 2010: 367).  
Perhaps the most important piece of evidence regarding Chretien’s 
Commonwealth policy was his speech entitled, “Making progress through 
multilateralism” given at the Commonwealth annual speech in 2004, just after 
he had left office as prime minister. In his speech, he notes that international 
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institutions “like the Commonwealth and the United Nations” have “enhanced 
our ability to be constructive” and “to resolve major global challenges” 
(CHRETIEN 2004). Within the Commonwealth, Chrétien notes, is the ability to 
more regularly dialogue with other countries, and to have “fruitful nation to 
nation conversations”. One of the major issues in Chrétien’s speech, however, 
is that he once again only mentioned the Commonwealth sparingly. He noted 
many successes of Canadian foreign policy—typically through the UN—but 
only turned to focus on the Commonwealth at the end of his speech.  
The end of Chrétien’s speech does, however, highlight the successes of 
the Commonwealth during his time as prime minister. He notes that the 
Commonwealth “stood united against Apartheid”. He also notes the role played 
by the Commonwealth in restoring a form of democracy in Nigeria with the 
release of political prisoners, including future president Olesegun Obasanjo 
(CHRETIEN 2004). Finally, he argues that the Commonwealth played a role in 
“bringing healing and democratic rule in Zimbabwe”, a point that is very 
heavily contested by many scholars and organizations. Although, Zimbabwe 
holds regular elections, the outcomes cannot be considered free or fair, which is 
a baseline definition of democracy.  
One important facet of the Commonwealth, Chrétien notes, is that 
“Leaders’ Retreat” in which the leaders of Commonwealth countries are able to 
meet, discuss issues, and find consensus (CHRETIEN 2004). In this way, 
Chrétien further acknowledges that the role of the Commonwealth helps to 
facilitate the work of the UN. In some ways, Chrétien used the Commonwealth 
to bolster Canada’s role on the world stage, but, in truth, there was also much 
more that could have been done. Although the Commonwealth does not have 
binding power around the world, there were plenty of issues that could have 
been further discussed or promoted through the Commonwealth during 
Chrétien’s time in office. This article assesses the legacy of Jean Chrétien with 
regards to his involvement (and sometimes lack thereof) in using the 
Commonwealth to tackle larger global issues. 
 
Canada as a « Middle Power » 
Any discussion of power requires at least a brief investigation of 
international relations theory. In particular, the realist and liberal schools of 
thought are most direct in their assessment of the role of states, international 
institutions, and power asymmetry in the world. Canada will likely never 
challenge the predominant powers of the world, but, at the same time, Canada 
still possesses considerable economic, political, and technological strength. It 
has an important role to play, then, as a “middle power”. The realist school of 
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thought (MORGENTHAU 1948; WALTZ 1979; MEARSHEIMER 2001; SCHWELLER 
1998)1 examines the special roles of economic and military power in the world. 
Since the United States is still the world’s most predominant power, Canada’s 
position next to the United States is impacted by geography. Most notably, 
Canada’s role as a middle power is also influenced by Hegemonic Stability 
Theory (GILPIN 1981), which argues that the world system is most secure (and 
peaceful) with the position of a major hegemonic power. But what can Canada 
do then if geographically located next to the hegemon? The liberal school of 
thought (DOYLE 1986; KEOHANE AND NYE 1977)2 investigates the role of 
cooperation in the international arena. Most notable are international 
institutions — like the Commonwealth — in promoting peace and norms across 
the world. Canada’s role as a middle power can be most forceful and helpful to 
world politics by utilizing multilateral institutions wherever and whenever the 
need arises. A middle power can also balance between hard and soft forms of 
power (NYE 1990; NYE 2004) to leverage Canada’s position and influence to 
change and impact the world through agreements and treaties, rather than 
through the use of military power or economic sanctions (which still remain as 
policy options if negotiations fail). 
Canada, given its geographic proximity to the United States, has long 
sought a foreign policy as a “middle power” (NEUFELD 1995; CHAPNICK 2005). 
Canada does not have the power to compete economically and militarily with 
the United States, but the country is a fairly large—and powerful—state, 
despite being overshadowed by its neighbour. Canadians themselves have 
contributed to this perception. Rather than settling for being a small power, 
Canada has taken on the mantle of adopting a strategy to impact the world in 
niche areas as a “middle power”. By invoking the term, “power”, successive 
Canadian governments have acknowledged the realist reality in the world that 
there are threats to world security. However, a middle power also more 
frequently utilizes international organisations to promote normative changes in 
the world in favour of human rights and democracy. Liberalism, or more 
narrowly, liberal internationalism, is a theoretical perspective through which 
Canada’s impact on world affairs can be viewed.  
This essay investigates this intersection: Canada’s role as a middle 
power in the Chrétien years with respect to his use of multilateral organizations, 
notably the Commonwealth. Although a fuller discussion of the Chrétien years 
                                                
1 These books are amongst the most well-known—and cited—on the topic of realism. They can be 
found with a quick search on the subject of political realism, structural realism, and neoclassical 
realism. 
2 Like the footnote on realism, these books are amongst the most noteworthy on the topic of 
liberalism in international relations theory. 
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requires an overarching examination of his foreign policy strategy throughout 
all years and with all institutions, a more narrow focus on the Commonwealth 
provides an opportunity to assess successes and failures of his opportunity to 
further Canada’s role as a middle power in light of Hegemonic Stability Theory 
and the current balance of global power in the Twenty-first Century.  
By the time Chrétien became prime minister he had already had a lot of 
experience in a range of different government positions. His foreign affairs 
experience, while noteworthy, was not as comprehensive as other areas though. 
He briefly served as the Secretary of State for External Affairs (now Minister of 
Foreign Affairs) under the brief tenure of former Prime Minister, John Turner 
in 1984. Chrétien coterminously served as Deputy Prime Minister, though, so 
his specific attention on foreign affairs was more limited. This was also a time 
in which Chrétien had just lost his challenge to become the leader of the Liberal 
Party to John Turner, also in 1984 (MARTIN 1995: 341). Therefore, Chrétien 
was very familiar with the workings of government by the time he became 
prime minister. He was also acutely aware of the relationship between Canada 
and the United States, and the ways that Canada could promote its own values 
on the world stage.  
Canada’s middle power strategy has been aided by a presence in the 
Commonwealth. Although not as forceful as other international institutions, 
Canada has impacted the world through the use of the Commonwealth.  
 
Canada and the Commonwealth 
Although an in depth review of the Commonwealth is outside of the 
scope of this project, there are a few important dates and events that mark 
important changes to Canada and its role within the organisation3. The 
Commonwealth was initially formed in 1926 out of the dominions of the 
British Empire. This nascent organisation was more formally developed in 
1931 with the Statute of Westminster, which, among other things, gave Canada 
much more formal independence from the United Kingdom (Canada became a 
distinct entity in 1867 with the British North America Act, but was still 
governed by Westminster in foreign policy). Canada joined the Commonwealth 
when the organisation was created alongside Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa.4 Put simply, the Commonwealth was a mechanism of 
                                                
3 For a full overview of the Commonwealth see SRINIVASAN 2005; HANCOCK AND LATHAM 1977; 
HALL 1971 
4 Newfoundland was Britain’s oldest dominion, but voted to merge with Canada as its tenth 
province in 1949 rather than staying as a British colony (SRINIVASAN 2005: 17). 
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maintaining the structure and entities contained within the British Empire, but 
also of engaging in the process of decolonisation at the same time.  
Canada played a significant role in the Commonwealth and was at the 
forefront of major discussions such as the London (1949), Singapore (1971), 
and Harare Declarations (1991). These declarations helped to solidify important 
norms within the organisation and in the realm of international affairs. In 
essence, the Commonwealth played a larger role in world affairs. The 
Commonwealth also gave middle powers, like Canada, an opportunity to 
influence and shape policy throughout the world. 
In recent decades, Canada has played an active role in other multilateral 
organisations as well such as the UN, NATO, the G7/G8,5 the G20, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and La Francophonie. In some 
ways, these other organisations have helped to raise the profile of Canada, but, 
in other ways, Canada is less influential in the world. The Commonwealth is 
unique in the sense that Canada is able to influence West Africa, southern 
Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the South Pacific, and Oceania, among other 
regions of the world. The growth of Canada’s global role has, however, 
diminished the role the country plays in the Commonwealth. In Canadian 
foreign policy the Commonwealth has become less of a vital resource. In the 
words of political scientist, David Black, it has become a “wasting asset” 
(BLACK 2010). 
Alongside a discussion of the Commonwealth, it is specifically worth 
highlighting that Canada is a member of La Francophonie—in essence, a 
French version of the Commonwealth created in 1970. Canada’s large French-
speaking population rooted in modern-day Quebec’s connection to the French 
Empire speaks to Canada’s dual language and heritage. Although Canada had 
expressly refuted the growth of La Francophonie in the 1960s (SRINIVASAN 
2005: 92), the first Summit was held in 1986 (a few years prior to Chrétien’s 
leadership of Canada). In fact, Canada hosted the second summit in 1987 in 
Quebec City, the eighth summit in Moncton, New Brunswick in 1999 (under 
Chrétien’s tenure), and the twelfth summit in Quebec City in 2008.  
Chrétien’s role in the Commonwealth should also be noted in light of 
the role of La Francophonie, and the delicate nature of dealing with an 
increasingly restive secessionist movement in Quebec throughout the 1990s, 
which continues today, only with slightly less intensity. Canada’s role in the 
Commonwealth overlapped with La Francophonie on several occasions. Most 
notably, Canada’s membership in the Commonwealth helped the country to 
                                                
5 The G6 was formed in 1975. Canada joined the group in 1976, thus creating the G7. In 1997, 
Russia became the eighth member of the group, thus forming the G8.  
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carefully critique France without overtly jeopardising the Canadian-French 
relationship. At the 1995 Commonwealth conference in Australia, for example, 
the members of the Commonwealth were able to collectively condemn the 
French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, which occurred right before the start 
of the conference (SRINIVASAN 2005: 141). Canada was able to criticize France 
within the multilateral organisation without the need to castigate French 
behaviour and hurt the bilateral relationship.  
The Commonwealth is not a major global institution — at least as 
compared to the UN or the European Union — but it remains important for 
several reasons. It unites almost one-third of the countries of the world, it 
provides historic and institutional connections, it serves as the second largest 
multi-sport event in the world behind the Olympics, and unites many English-
speaking peoples of the world.   
For a country like Canada, membership in the UN, World Trade 
Organisation, and NAFTA are now considered the most important 
relationships. These relationships are both pivotal to Canada’s political and 
economic role in the world. However, within the Commonwealth, Canadian 
leaders are regularly able to meet with other world leaders who share similar 
values and history. In some ways, the Commonwealth helps Canadian prime 
ministers in other multilateral institutions because it gives them greater 
exposure to these other world leaders, and more opportunities to rally support 
for pressing contemporary issues. Former foreign affairs minister, Lloyd 
Axworthy, (who served as Chrétien’s second foreign affairs minister from 1996 
to 2000) acknowledges that “over the years our aid efforts and our membership 
in the Commonwealth and La Francophonie brought us into contact with 
nations in those areas (the Americas and Africa)” (AXWORTHY 2004: 238). The 
context of the quote is that Canada was able to play a more significant role at 
the UN because of Canada’s other multilateral priorities.  
However, over time, Canada’s role in the Commonwealth has 
diminished as other multilateral institutions have become important. The 
decreased role of Canada in the Commonwealth was not initiated by Jean 
Chrétien, but it continued to decline in popularity during his time as prime 
minister. In essence, he did nothing outstanding to reverse the trend. Consider, 
in contrast, that Canada — and Canadians more broadly — held strong and 
very positive views of the role of the Commonwealth for its first 50 years 
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Chrétien’s Commonwealth-driven successes in Nigeria and at the UN 
During Chrétien’s time within the Commonwealth, the organization 
advanced with the creation of a significant document, which built upon the 
Harare Declaration of 1991. After the 1995 meeting, the Millbrook 
Commonwealth Action Programme instituted the promotion of democracy 
within the Commonwealth.  
Heads of Government agreed the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme 
on the Harare Declaration, designed to fulfil more effectively the democracy and 
development commitments contained in the Harare Declaration. They 
established the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare 
Declaration to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Harare principles. 
 
Millbrook provides a norm against a coup d’etat within a member state 
and provides, at least on paper, the Commonwealth with an important ability to 
expel members who violate the democratic norms of the organisation 
(Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration, 
1995). In effect, the Millbrook programme affords greater powers to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.  
Another significant area of success in the Commonwealth was 
promoting democracy (or at least elections) in Nigeria. The Chrétien 
government played a major role in sanctioning Nigeria for its lack of 
democratic rights. After holding an election in 1993, then reneging on the 
results, Nigeria military dictatorship remained in power, which, to the chagrin 
of the international community, still involved significant human rights abuses. 
The Commonwealth intervened as a major international institution with the 
ability to pressure the bad behaviour of the Nigerian authoritarian government. 
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s representative in the Commonwealth Ministerial 
Action Group (CMAG) joined with his fellow foreign ministers to implement 
the Harare Declaration (AXWORTHY 2004: 224). Over the issue of Nigeria, the 
members of the Commonwealth were divided as to how to proceed. Some 
members advocated harsh measures; whereas others wanted to push Nigeria 
towards reform without embarrassing the country on the world stage. On this 
issue, Canada broke with Britain and Australia on harshly reproving Nigeria 
and opting to implement the principles of Harare and push for careful reforms 
(AXWORTHY 2004; CHRETIEN 2010). Canada took a leading role on Nigeria 
through the Commonwealth by engaging the Nigerian government for reform, 
but also by sending a “strong signal” that reform was expected (AXWORTHY 
2004: 225). Canada implemented a range of sanctions aimed at the Nigerian 
leadership in order to deter bad behaviours. Nigeria reacted by closing their 
high commission in Ottawa and by blaming Canada in the media for bomb 
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attacks in the country (which turned out to be carried out by dissident groups 
within the country) (AXWORTHY 2004: 225). Despite the difficult turn in the 
Nigerian-Canadian relationship, Nigeria was invited to London to discuss its 
role in the Commonwealth. Nigeria wanted to remain within the 
Commonwealth, but General Sani Abacha was unwilling to change. When 
Abacha died suddenly in 1998, his successor was eager to remove Nigeria’s 
suspension from the Commonwealth and opened the country to new elections 
in 1999 — a time when Nigeria was more democratic (AXWORTHY 2004: 227). 
Outside of specific Commonwealth changes, perhaps the most 
successful part of Chrétien’s legacy has been the international move to 
eliminate the use of landmines in warfare. This is his premier legacy on the 
world stage, despite the fact that not all countries support this policy. Chrétien 
has often noted that the regular meetings with Commonwealth leaders helped to 
build relationships, which helped to make changes on the international stage. 
Canada’s ongoing role facilitated the development of core peace treaties, most 
notably the Ottawa Treaty.  
The Ottawa Treaty was first launched in 1996 as a means to 
decreasing—and then eliminating—the use of landmines in war. More 
formally, the treaty was drafted in mid-1997 and entered into force in March 
1999 making Canada a major spotlight in the world. With the ratification of the 
treaty, Canada’s role as middle power was obvious. Canada played a significant 
role in changing the norms and expectations of the world despite its status as a 
middle power, rather than a superpower.  
At the time of writing (November 2013), 161 states in the world are part 
of the Ottawa Treaty. The vast majority of Commonwealth countries supported 
Canada’s efforts to eradicate the usage of personal land mines. In doing so, the 
world could be safer for civilians especially those living in post-conflict areas. 
Under the Ottawa Treaty, signee states are expected to eradicate their landmine 
stockpiles, and then pledge not to purchase more at a later date. In effect, the 
norm for peace grows, and the reality of the loss of life and limbs decreases. 
In using the Commonwealth, the Chrétien government specifically 
helped to bring change in Nigeria, and around the world with the Ottawa 
Treaty. Canada also played an important role in the NATO campaign in the 
former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. While Russia vetoed the proposed UN 
Security Council Resolution, Chrétien forged ahead with a desire to prevent 
another genocide. Although Canada’s role in both Bosnia and Kosovo was not 
at the forefront like the other cases, Canada used multilateralism to bring 
change in the world and through two missions: Stabilization Force and Kosovo 
Force, peace was restored in the Balkans. The Chrétien government deserves 
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credit here for using multilateral institutions to promote peace and to further 
Canada’s role as a middle power.   
 
Chretien’s Commonwealth failures in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka 
Throughout Chrétien’s tenure as prime minister, there were failures as 
well. There are limits as to what can be fully blamed on any given prime 
minister because there are almost 200 other countries in the world responsible 
for world affairs, but there were times when Canada could have — and should 
have — done more in the world.  
Chrétien’s failures are most noteworthy in the civil wars of Rwanda and 
Sri Lanka, as well as the inability to act for real and viable change in 
Zimbabwe. Since both Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe were Commonwealth 
members at least at some point during Chrétien’s time as prime minister, he had 
the opportunity to act. In the case of Rwanda, Canada played a very significant 
role in the country, and could have mobilised other members of the 
Commonwealth in southern Africa to help.  
The country of Rwanda joined the Commonwealth in 2009 becoming 
only the second state with no formal links to Britain (after Mozambique) to 
accede to the organisation. This country in southern Africa and its horrific 
history in the 1990s is a major reason why Chrétien’s legacy was sullied as a 
result of an inability to mobilize multilateralism to prompt a dictator to reform, 
and to stop a genocide. Obviously, Chrétien cannot take all the blame as the 
United States was in a very strong geopolitical position to help. But Canada 
could have played a role if it helped to assemble an international coalition to at 
least minimize the bloodshed. Perhaps a well-organized (and well-armed) 
international force of a few thousand personnel could have altered the extent of 
the genocide dramatically.6 The international community — including Canada 
— sat idly by and watched as 800,000 people were slaughtered over the course 
of 100 days in mid-1994.  
Perhaps one of the major reasons for the inability — and unwillingness 
— to act in Rwanda was a result of military resources. Canada’s military fought 
with distinction in numerous major wars, but, especially in recent years, has 
faced significant budget and troop cuts. Historian, J.L. Granatstein argues that 
Chrétien played a role in “killing” the Canadian military by slashing the budget 
                                                
6 International Relations scholar, John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago speculated that 
even a force of 500 well-trained American (or international) military personnel could have 
dissuaded much of the bloodshed in a panel discussion at the 2013 International Studies 
Association annual conference in San Francisco. 
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and stalling significant necessary equipment and technology upgrades during 
the 1990s and 2000s (GRANATSTEIN 2004: 163). This discussion, although not 
central to this work, reflects a wider debate on the role of the Canadian military 
and the ability to respond to crises around the world in the case of genocide.  
The Rwandan genocide is particularly painful for Canada given the 
prominence of Canadians in the UN at the time. Canada also gave more money 
(per capita) to Rwanda than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa at that 
time — the linkages between the two countries were strongly in place 
(DALLAIRE 2003: 216). Moreover, since many members of the Commonwealth 
are located in southern Africa, it could have been an opportunity for Canada to 
emerge as a significant middle power with the ability to do real good in the 
world, like stopping the genocide. Canadian, Lieutenant General, Roméo 
Dallaire, was head of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
during the crisis. Despite his best efforts, Canada and other members of the 
international community did not respond to his calls for help as the genocide 
started and then led to widespread bloodshed. The Canadian government, 
Dallaire notes, did not have a “coherent and integrated policy toward Rwanda, 
only isolated department initiatives that in a time of crisis did not come 
together” (DALLAIRE 2003: 216).   
Rwanda is a case where Chrétien’s legacy must be evaluated negatively. 
Adding to the sense of shame is that Canada played a prominent role in the 
mission to protect Rwandans. Roméo Dallaire tried to stop the slaughter of 
ethnic Tutsi’s (and moderate Hutu’s) by radical Hutu’s, but without any 
support, he was not able to singly prevent the genocide. Canada could have 
taken a leading role, or mobilized support through the Commonwealth to stop 
the genocide. Of course, hindsight is twenty-twenty and it was not expected 
that Rwanda would descend into extreme violence so quickly. Nonetheless, 
Rwanda ranks as a failure for many world leaders, including Prime Minister 
Chrétien. He, and other world leaders, have often expressed regret at their 
inaction to stop the genocide.  
Zimbabwe, in many respects and by many statistical measures, is one of 
the worst countries in the world. The great shame is that Zimbabwe had much 
potential prior to Robert Mugabe’s time as president. Moreover, many 
countries in southern Africa are beginning to thrive economically with young, 
vibrant, and transparent leadership combined with robust institutions that have 
created fair societies within which business can flourish (RADELET 2010). 
Over time Zimbabwe continued to score worse on economic, 
transparency, and political freedom indicators. One role for the Commonwealth 
under Section 8 of the Harare Declaration was to work on “democracy, 
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democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the 
rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” 
(Harare Commonwealth Declaration 1991). Numerous other parts of Section 8 
described economic development, education, health care, and general 
improvements in the society — none of which could be ascribed to Zimbabwe 
under Mugabe.  
Zimbabwe was finally suspended from the Commonwealth in March 
2002 — and opted to leave the organisation voluntarily at the end of 2003. 
Canada’s historic role in the Commonwealth — to push countries to reform 
whilst remaining in the organisation — proved too soft in the case of 
Zimbabwe. Although, as noted earlier, this strategy proved successful with 
Nigeria after a diplomatic rift between the countries, Nigeria made some initial 
improvements. Zimbabwe has continued to get worse, though, and something 
could have been done in this regard. Canada has a model of acting with both 
elements of realism and liberalism in its sanctions of Nigeria, which could have 
been replicated with Zimbabwe.  
The Commonwealth could still play a role here in continuing to sanction 
the Mugabe regime. If all Commonwealth members resolved to limit trade with 
states like Zimbabwe — similar to the way that the United States has 
sanctioned Iran over its nuclear program and pressured its trading partners —
the situation may have changed by now.  
Overall, the Zimbabwe situation reflects Chrétien’s larger foreign 
policy, which was much more cautious than Mulroney’s. Canada had a more 
reduced international presence in the form of peacekeepers and desire for 
intervention to stop conflict (NOSSAL 1998/1999: 93-94). Part of this was due 
to electoral politics where Mulroney was seen to have overstepped his bounds; 
Chrétien, in contrast, did not do enough. Not acting in the international arena is 
not necessarily a bad thing, but Chrétien could have made better use of 
international institutions like the Commonwealth to better seek diplomatic 
solutions to international crises and issues. By further sanctioning Zimbabwe, 
the Commonwealth could have sent a much clearer message on the erosion of 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the country. Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth could have encouraged members to limit trade, or impose 
sanctions on the regime, at least until improvements have been made in 
Zimbabwe. The latter option is quite harsh, but Zimbabwe continues to undergo 
numerous human rights and economic problems, which will only continue to 
lessen the opportunities of young people in the country. The Commonwealth 
has, in essence, done a disservice to Zimbabweans by vacillating too long on 
this issue.  
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Finally, the case of Sri Lanka is worth noting. Starting in 1983 and 
ending in 2009, Sri Lanka went through a long and bloody civil war. Although 
Chrétien can only shoulder minimal blame for the conflict, Canada could have 
initiated more pressure through the Commonwealth to uphold human rights. 
Given Canada’s large Tamil population, members of the Liberal government 
often did speak to the issue of supporting the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, but 
this rarely made it to the top levels of government. Chrétien was right to 
distance himself from the Tamil Tigers within the Sri Lankan civil war, but 
more pressure for a peaceful resolution of the conflict could have been useful, 
even though Chrétien did give a speech on Canadian federalism as a model for 
post-conflict resolution in Sri Lanka.  
 
Chretien’s legacy and the Commonwealth 
Historically, the Commonwealth has provided Canadians with a 
significant diplomatic opportunity to engage parts of the world more deeply 
than in other international organizations. While Canada typically seeks to 
utilize multilateral institutions, the country has relatively little power — or 
voting rights — when compared to the permanent five members of the UN 
Security Council, for example. 
Chrétien’s foreign policy legacy remains noteworthy for some successes 
— especially through the Commonwealth — with regards to Nigeria. Although 
Nigeria continues to struggle with governance and identity-based politics, there 
is a modicum of democratic response to the people. Under Olesugun Obasanjo, 
Nigeria’s President from 1999 to 2007, it was a better system. Chrétien also 
used the opportunity of the Commonwealth to help build consensus at other 
international institutions for issues like the eradication of landmines.  
There are also a number of notable failures of Chrétien’s foreign policy 
with regards to the Commonwealth. The Rwandan genocide, the Sri Lankan 
conflict (which only ended in 2009), and the failure to help reform Zimbabwe 
are amongst the most notable problems of the era. Again, Chrétien cannot 
shoulder this criticism alone, but he could have been more assertive in his 
priorities with regards to applying pressure and ending these conflicts.  
Overall, Chrétien missed an opportunity to revive the Commonwealth, 
but did so in choosing to engage other organizations. This is not necessarily a 
poor strategy for a middle power, but it  undercuts Canada’s role in the world 
where the country could be a major leader in an organisation like the 
Commonwealth. In terms of international relations theory, Canada’s role as a 
middle power is a response to the need and desire to impact the world, whilst 
cognizant of the neighbouring hegemonic power, the United States. Canada’s 
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ability to establish peaceful norms can be completed with a mix of realist and 
liberal positions. Realism is necessary when situations of conflict arise such as 
Rwanda, Sri Lanka, or in a different way, Zimbabwe. Overt use of military 
forces, or military support, can play a role, as do other realist options like 
economic sanctions, and overt diplomatic pressures. Liberalism, specifically 
liberal institutionalism, can also play an important role. International 
institutions like the Commonwealth provide a forum from which to cajole, 
nudge, and alter the poor behaviour of some states. This provides Canada an 
opportunity to assert itself as a middle power in the world and to make a real —
and lasting — impact. 
Future Canadian prime ministers could do well by revitalising Canada’s 
role in the Commonwealth. The organisation could be used in two ways. First, 
the Commonwealth could do more to promote democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights among member states by sanctioning member states that 
continually violate these norms with impunity. By upholding these norms, 
Canada could help push the world towards greater responsiveness to the needs 
of people. Second, the Commonwealth could be used as a “staging ground” for 
major international reforms like the Ottawa Treaty. By using the 
Commonwealth members as support, major international treaties could be 
introduced, debated, and then approved through the organisation. At that point, 
the treaty could be taken to the UN with the full support of all Commonwealth 
members. In essence, this would be a new tactic, and could provide middle 
powers like Canada an ability to make greater changes on the world stage.  
Middle powers like Canada will have little opportunity to utilize hard 
power politics, which, at times, is necessary to stop genocide. By utilizing 
support from Commonwealth members, an international coalition could have 
been constructed to stop the atrocities in Rwanda. Or, alternatively, another 
organisation like NATO or the African Union to could have been used to 
intervene, simply with funding commitments from Commonwealth states. At 
the very least, it would have served to improve Canada’s role on the world 
stage and revitalise the Commonwealth.  
Overall, Chrétien maintains an enduring legacy in Canada. Given the 
nature of polarised politics, part of this legacy depends on support for Liberal 
candidates. Chrétien did a lot of things well as Prime Minister. However, his 
use of the Commonwealth as an opportunity for furthering international issues 
was used, but perhaps underutilized. There are a lot of issues for any given 
Prime Minister to deal with, but there were times when the Commonwealth 
could have — and should have been — a higher priority.  
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